Charred bodies had been flung from the vehicle and lay on the road, dusted with flour and sugar that the victims were bringing home from market. Everyone killed was a resident of Sabool or the neighboring hamlet of Humaydah. Many lost their hands and legs," said Nawaf Massoud Awadh, a sheikh from Sabool.
Two victims were a woman and girl, clutched in a lifeless embrace. Moving in closer, al-Sabooli realized that the woman and girl were his mother and year-old sister. He also saw his father among the dead. Videos provided to Human Rights Watch depicted chaos at the scene. Most of the other passengers were farmers who went to Radaa to sell their crops. They included Mabruk al-Dobari, 14, who sold qat to support his family because his father was disabled.
Local and international media quoted unnamed Yemeni government officials as saying the attack's intended target was Abd al-Raouf al-Dahab, an alleged local Al-Qaeda chief whose late brother Tariq had led the January takeover of Radaa. The al-Dahabs are the most influential family in Radaa and surrounding areas. Abd al-Raouf al-Dahab is from Manasseh, a village about 15 kilometers north of Radaa. The Land Cruiser was struck as it approached an intersection where one road led to Sabool and the other to Manasseh.
But al-Dahab was not inside the vehicle or anywhere in sight. Subsequent drone strikes have also failed to kill al-Dahab. Ahmad al-Sabooli holds the photos of his father, Nasser Saleh Nasser, his mother, Raselah Ali, and his sister Doalah, 10, who were among 12 civilians killed in a US airstrike in Sarar on September 2, Initial media reports quoted Yemeni officials as saying Yemeni warplanes carried out the Radaa attack. Available evidence from the site does not clarify whether the attack was carried out by a drone or a fighter jet. Six witnesses said they saw the warplanes drop or launch munitions that they thought were bombs or missiles.
Two witnesses told Human Rights Watch they saw a black tail fin near the burning vehicle, and that would-be rescuers used it to try to ram open a door of the vehicle. The shrapnel that witnesses brought Human Rights Watch from the site is more consistent with damage caused by a bomb, which would point to warplanes. Most workers are subsistence farmers who grow and sell qat. Distraught relatives and friends had to collect the charred remains of the victims by themselves and drive them to the city morgue in Radaa. Upon reaching the outskirts of the city, troops from the elite Republican Guard blocked their entry for two hours.
Then officials at the morgue refused the bodies. The Sabool villagers spent the night on the streets of Radaa, fending off stray dogs from the corpses spread out on the beds of pickup trucks. He also promised further compensation, villagers said. In Sanaa, President Hadi announced he would create a special committee to investigate the Radaa attack. On April 26, , Garoon again promised payments to Sabool residents if they did not participate in a news conference on targeted killings being held that day in Sanaa by the UK-based nongovernmental organization Reprieve.
The residents did not participate, yet the payment did not arrive, they said. It is not publicly known if the funds came from the United States. Long before the Yemeni authorities took financial responsibility for the killings, the family of Abd al-Raouf al-Dahab, the purported target of the strike, offered financial assistance to families around Radaa who lost relatives in targeted killing operations. In Radaa, animosity toward the Yemeni and the US governments was in evidence after the airstrike. At a rally in Radaa the night after the attack, one man drew cheers as he railed against both countries:.
On August 29, , four missiles launched from a drone killed five men outside a mosque in Kashamir, a farming village of mud-and-stone huts in Hadramawt province in southeast Yemen. The strike killed three suspected AQAP members who were strangers to the village. Assuming the laws of war were applicable, the attack may have been unlawfully disproportionate depending on the military importance of the alleged AQAP members.
Rather, relatives said the three targeted suspects had sought out the cleric to challenge his statements criticizing AQAP. He taught at a government school and was studying for a doctorate at Hadramawt University. Salim Jaber had returned to his native village that week to attend the wedding of a cousin.
The second time, three unknown men inside the car, who were not from Khashamir, sent neighborhood children to ask for the cleric to come out. The men refused. After Isha prayer, several villagers saw the men drive to the back of the mosque. The three men in the car asked a young boy to go to the mosque to bring the cleric to them. Salim Jaber feared the strangers were seeking revenge for his sermons and proposed meeting them over dinner at his house. Salim and Walid Jaber approached the men and sat with two of them beneath a cluster of date palms.
Several villagers gathered at a corner to watch, in case the Jabers needed protection. But if the unidentified men intended to harm Salim Jaber, the drones struck first. The men waited several minutes and then approached slowly, said Abdullah Salim bin Ali Jaber, a cousin of Salim and Walid who also had rushed to the scene:. The father said two men brought him into the mosque and supported him by each arm as he viewed the corpses, wrapped in plastic under blocks of ice as the village had no refrigerated morgue:. Relatives said they identified Salim Jaber only by his cheekbone, and Walid Jaber by the remains of his handgun and his ornate belt, which was somehow intact.
Faisal Jaber showed Human Rights Watch a series of photos and videos he had taken the day before and the day after the attack.
Killing You Smartly
The first series showed Walid Jaber, smiling and dancing at the wedding party in a white robe and his ornate belt. The second series showed the SUV melted into a twisted mass, and ordnance that Human Rights Watch identified as remnants of Hellfire missiles. The photos also showed dismembered body parts and faces burned beyond recognition. Only one stranger was identified, by a family that traveled kilometers to Khashamir to view photos of the remains.
After the airstrike, enraged villagers created a roadblock that stopped government cars along the main east-west road through the province, but ended it when local leaders persuaded them to instead hold a peaceful rally. Faisal Jaber heard nothing more until June, after Human Rights Watched and other international nongovernmental organizations raised the issue of compensation with US government officials.
At that time, the Yemeni government ordered condolence payments of 2. At the the time of writing, the payments had yet to arrive. Villagers want redress, but they also want the drones flying over their area to stop, saying they are traumatizing children and causing women to miscarry. On December 17, , three days after the US State Department designated AQAP as a terrorist organization, up to five Tomahawk cruise missiles armed with cluster munitions struck the hamlet of al-Majalah in southern Abyan province.
In fact the missiles were launched by a US Navy vessel. AQAP was committing violence against the Yemeni government at the time of the attack, and its predecessor, AQY, had claimed responsibility for attacks such as the deadly suicide bombing of the US Embassy in Sanaa in However, the hostilities at the time were not considered to have reached the intensity of an armed conflict necessary for the applicability of the laws of war. However, even within a laws-of-war analysis, the attack used indiscriminate cluster munitions, and caused indiscriminate and possibly disproportionate civilian casualties.
Two classified diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks reveal that the United States engaged with Yemen in a concerted effort to conceal the US role. Much has been written about the strike on al-Majalah,  but little has been published on its aftermath. Residents say they never received compensation for civilian deaths or the local development projects promised by the Yemeni government. Al-Majalah is a tiny village at the foot of steep mountains about kilometers east of the southern port city of Aden. They slept in huts made of straw and wood or of steel caging on which they draped their tenting.
The missiles struck two adjacent sets of Bedouin huts around 6 a.
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Saleh bin Fareed, a prominent tribal leader, drove to the site from Aden fearing he could not reach it. But the site was in a valley, not dug into the mountains, and while it was three kilometers off a dirt road, bin Fareed drove right up to it. Video footage of the immediate aftermath shows piles of dead or dying sheep and goats, as well as human body parts and the charred metal frames of the Bedouin huts. There were 30 houses in the area of the strike.
All were burned and 12 were destroyed, said Moqbil Abu-Lukaish, a community leader who lost 28 relatives that day. Residents of al-Majalah and nearby areas gathered up the body parts. Unable to identify which pieces belonged to which body, they buried them in common graves. But the reports did not say that the alleged training camp at al-Majalah was linked to that plot or others. The cluster munitions used in the strike, BLU bomblets, are bright yellow cylinders about the size of a large soda can.
Each bomblet is encased in steel designed to break into approximately fragments capable of piercing armor. The BLUs also have incendiary capabilities. Cluster munitions are inaccurate and unreliable weapons that by their very nature pose unacceptable dangers to civilians. They pose an immediate threat by randomly scattering exploding submunitions over a vast area. A total of 84 countries have ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the international treaty prohibiting the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions, and requiring clearance of remnants as well as assistance to victims of the weapons.
Neither Yemen nor the United States is among them. At least four people were killed after the initial strike by handling unexploded bomblets that had been scattered over a 1.
"Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda"
Four days after the strike, on December 21, , during a massive protest rally at al-Majalah, three more people were killed and nine others injured by unexploded bomblets from the cluster munition remnants. The people in the car removed the bomblets, which they had taken as evidence, and in doing so detonated them, killing one other person. Residents cordoned off the area, but children nevertheless returned to the site of the attack. On January 24, —more than two years after the strike—a young boy brought one of the bomblets with him when he returned home for lunch, with deadly consequences.
Mahdi, a relative who went to the house later that day, described what happened:. The boy and two siblings were injured, Mahdi said. Al-Kazami fought in Afghanistan in the s; he was among hundreds of Yemenis who joined the mujahideen with the approval of the Saleh government and tribal leaders. He was arrested in by Yemeni security forces on suspicion of terrorism-related crimes and served about two years in prison. Whatever his ties to violent militants, al-Kazami traveled freely through the area upon his release from prison, suggesting ample opportunities for capture.
Indeed, residents said his movements required him to pass multiple checkpoints at which security forces could have detained him. Al-Majalah residents interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they were not aware that he was engaged in military operations and had not seen a training camp, but added that they could not be sure. Twenty days before the strike, six men who were not known to local residents joined al-Kazami in al-Majalah and began using hydraulic equipment and dynamite to dig a well about one kilometer from the area that the missiles struck.
There were no wells near the camp, creating hardships for residents, they said. Immediately after the strike, a group of armed, masked men appeared at the scene and removed the bodies of the six newcomers and several wounded men. The Obama and Saleh administrations sought to portray the al-Majalah strike as having been carried by the Yemeni government without direct US participation. Two weeks later, state-run Saba News published an extensive account of the strike, which it described as the work of Yemeni security forces, complete with a photograph of a squadron of gleaming MiGs—an attack jet in the Yemeni Air Force arsenal that is incapable of firing Tomahawk cruise missiles.
David Petraeus, then head of US central command, according to the cable. The January cable suggests that US authorities were unaware and unconcerned about the civilian toll. AQAP immediately sought to capitalize on the strike, showing up at a rally on December 21, , to denounce the deaths. The problem is between us and America and its agents. Beware taking the side of America! Surveillance aircraft flew over the site after the attack and the governor of Abyan said the interior minister and then-President Saleh phone him about the strike two hours after it took place, suggesting that the Yemeni government was aware of the civilian casualties.
They said most residents rejected the sum as insufficient and because the authorities did not promise to hold those responsible for the attacks to account. Said Mahdi:. The villagers rebuffed government offers to clear the cluster munition remnants, saying they feared the authorities would do a poor job and seek to conceal the evidence. They called for an international team to clear the site. In mid, several of the al-Majalah families began accepting payments from the Yemeni authorities for property damages from the strike.
It does not cover the loss of homes but only of possessions—mostly goats, sheep, and honey bees. The residents were continuing to demand greater compensation for civilian deaths and funds for medical care for the injured. The residents said they are paying medical bills for the four children orphaned in the attack. The children, who at the time of the interview were 5, 4, and 7, respectively, said they still have nightmares about the attack. Nada was orphaned in the strike on al-Majalah. Aysha raised a hand to show a finger she lost in the airstrike.
Nada showed the gashes on her stomach from fragments of the ordnance. At the time of writing that request was pending. Since the attacks of September 11, , the US government has carried out hundreds of armed attacks against alleged terrorists in several countries.
These so-called targeted killings have been defined as deliberate lethal attacks by government forces, under the color of law, against a specific individual not in custody. President Obama and senior members of his administration have on various occasions asserted that its program of lethal attacks has been in full accordance with US and international law. The lawfulness of a targeted killing hinges in part on the applicable international law, which is determined by the context in which the attack takes place.
The laws of war are applicable during armed conflicts, whether between states or between a state and a non-state armed group. The laws of war are found in the Geneva Conventions of  and their two Additional Protocols,  the Hague Regulations,  and the customary laws of war.
It can be found in multinational conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  and in authoritative standards such as the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. For the laws of war to apply to fighting between the United States and Al-Qaeda or other non-state armed groups, the hostilities must reach the level of an armed conflict as defined by international law. Drawing on the Geneva Conventions of , rulings of international criminal courts and other sources, the International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC has articulated the following conditions for an armed conflict between a state and an armed group or between two armed groups , known as a non-international armed conflict:.
First, the hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity. This may be the case, for example, when the hostilities are of a collective character or when the government is obliged to use military force against the insurgents, instead of mere police forces. This means for example that these forces have to be under a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations. This standard is based on the facts on the ground, not the subjective views of the involved parties. Absent an armed conflict, international human rights law requires forces in operations against terrorist suspects to apply law enforcement standards.
Under this standard, individuals cannot be targeted for lethal attack solely because of past unlawful behavior but only for posing imminent or other grave threats to life when arrest is not a reasonable possibility. The fighting between the Yemeni government and AQAP has since at least reached the level of an armed conflict, though pinpointing the start of that conflict is difficult.
Obama has said instead that the United States does not carry out attacks against individuals in Yemen unless they pose a direct threat to the United States or its interests. In those instances in which the United States acts as a party to the armed conflict between the Yemeni government and AQAP, US military actions would fall within the laws of war. However, the administration asserts that it is only responding to a threat to the United States, suggesting it does not consider itself a party to the Yemen-AQAP conflict.
Under that rationale, the US government should be applying a war model to its actions only if there is a genuine armed conflict between the US and AQAP, which is not evident. The fundamental tenets of the laws of war are "civilian immunity" and "distinction. Deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects are strictly prohibited. Military objectives consist of combatants and "those objects which by their nature, location, or purpose make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
They would include individuals actively planning or directing future military operations, but not mere recruiters or propagandists who have no military operational role. In the conduct of military operations, warring parties must take constant care to spare the civilian population and civilian objects from the effects of hostilities, and are required to take precautionary measures with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.
These precautions include: doing everything feasible to verify that the objects to be attacked are military objectives and not civilians or civilian objects  ; taking all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare to minimize loss of civilian life  ; and doing everything feasible to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that a target is not a military objective or would result in disproportionate civilian loss.
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The laws of war also place obligations on warring parties to take steps to minimize harm to civilians. These include: avoiding locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas  ; endeavoring to remove the civilian population from the vicinity of military objectives  ; and not deliberately seeking to prevent attacks on one's forces by using them as "human shields.
At least four of the strikes detailed in this report were carried out by remotely piloted aircraft, or drones. The use of drones rather than manned aircraft does not directly affect the legal analysis of a particular attack. Drones, with their weaponry of missiles and laser-guided bombs, are not illegal under the laws of war—they can be used lawfully or unlawfully depending on the circumstances. As with other aerial attacks, drone operations may be hampered by poor intelligence or a failure to minimize the risk of civilian harm.
Thus members of an armed group who play a political role or a non-military logistics function cannot be targeted on that basis alone. Carrying out signature strikes increases the risk that civilians may be targeted, despite the obligation under the laws of war to presume an individual is a civilian unless determined to be a valid military objective. International human rights law provides every person with the inherent right to life. In particular, the use of lethal force is lawful only where there is an imminent threat to life and less extreme means, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, are insufficient to address that threat.
If the United States targets individuals based on overly elastic interpretations of the imminent threat to life that they pose, these killings may amount to an extrajudicial execution, a violation of the right to life and basic due process. States participating in an armed conflict have a duty to investigate serious violations of the laws of war.
A warring party is obligated to provide redress for the loss or injury caused by a violation of the laws of war. The right to remedy is also recognized under international human rights law. Human Rights Watch is unaware of the US providing condolence payments to civilian victims or their families in Yemen. But Central Command refused to release or describe the documents. In response to mounting calls for transparency about the targeted killing program, President Obama on May 23, outlined steps that he said his administration takes or will take before targeting an individual for attack.
The speech and fact sheet did not adequately explain the legal rationale for the targeted killings. Nor did they address the lawfulness of specific strikes. That is, the standards articulated go beyond the requirement of the laws of war. This may be indicative of a shift within the US administration from an armed conflict approach to a law enforcement approach in operations against alleged terrorists. However, the administration has not referred to international human rights law with respect to these policies, and spoke in terms of meeting policy guidelines, not adhering to law.
Less clear is whether that is because the standards the administration unveiled in May were not in effect at the time or because US military forces failed to apply them. In at least four of the targeted killings detailed in this report, Human Rights Watch found that civilians were present at the strike location and were killed. In two cases the civilians included women and children. In the other two cases the civilians were young men. In one of the targeted killings detailed in this report, the target was not in the vicinity of the strike, which killed 12 civilians.
In three of the cases detailed in this report, the evidence strongly suggests that capture of the target was feasible in areas under government control. In none of the cases has the administration sought to provide evidence that the target posed an imminent threat to life, the law enforcement standard. Human Rights Watch found no evidence of US post-strike investigations to verify the extent of civilian casualties. The Yemeni authorities began payments to some civilians in the cases described in this report after Human Rights Watch and other organizations raised concerns with the United States and Yemen about the failure to compensate.
However if the United States contributed to such payments it has not made that information public. The sporadic and smaller scale of operations against US targets by these groups in the 12 years since the attacks of September 11, , further diminishes the legal relevance of the war model. In his speech at the National Defense University on May 23, , Obama put forward legal and policy rationales for using force in various ways, yet he never explained why he believed a war paradigm was still applicable in many areas where the United States is using force in its counterterrorism efforts.
This report is dedicated to the memory of Ibrahim Mothana, a Yemeni youth activist and Human Rights Watch consultant who died on September 5, , at the age of The report was researched and written by Letta Tayler, senior terrorism and counterterrorism researcher for Human Rights Watch, with research assistance from consultants Farea al-Muslimi and Mothana.
James Ross, legal and policy director, provided legal review. Mark Hiznay, senior researcher in the Arms division, and Mary Wareham, advocacy director in the Arms Division, reviewed references to weaponry, and verified ordnance and photographic evidence from the attacks. Kyle Hunter, associate in the Emergencies division, and Jillian Slutzker associate in the Middle East and North Africa division, provided production assistance.
Grace Choi, publications director; Kathy Mills, publications specialist; and Fitzroy Hepkins, administrative manager, prepared the report for publication. Human Rights Watch thanks the many witnesses, relatives of those killed, human rights defenders, lawyers, Yemen scholars, journalists, diplomats, government officials, and other individuals whose assistance made this report possible.
Skip to main content. October 21, November 1, Map of Strikes. Summary On the evening of August 29, , five men gathered in a grove of date palms behind the local mosque in Khashamir, a village in southeast Yemen. Case Studies Human Rights Watch investigated the six strikes during two trips to Yemen in and In addition to the attack in Khashamir, this report details the following strikes: Wessab, April 17, Two drones launched at least three Hellfire missiles at a car in Wessab, a township in Dhamar province in central Yemen.
The strike appears not to have complied with the Obama administration guidelines because it appears that al-Radmi could have been captured rather than killed. Posted by Nick Fielding at 1 comments. Tuesday, 1 October Marine generals sacked for Camp Bastion failings. When a small group of Taliban fighters cut through the fence and got into the massive Camp Bastion in southwestern Helmand province in September last year I wrote the following: "The Camp Bastion night attack will go down as one of the most one-sided and audacious attacks in the history of modern warfare.
The cost to the Taliban, besides the deaths of its fighters, was probably no more than a few thousand dollars. The costs to the Coalition runs into hundreds of millions of dollars". It has taken a year for the American military's most senior commanders to respond to the attack, but now they have done so.
In what has been referred to as an "unprecedented" decision, the two senior American officers at the base have been retired from the service ie sacked. Major General Charles M Gurganus and Major General Gregg A Sturdevant "did not take the necessary steps to ensure force protection," says the official inquiry, resulting in the deaths of two marines and injury to eight others, as well as massive loss of aircraft and equipment.
I'm not asking you to feel sorry for me, but Mark Gurganus and Greg Sturdevant were close personal friends of mine. I served with them for decades. They're extraordinary Marine officers who have served their country with distinction and honor for many years. But commandership is a sacred responsibility and the standard for general officers is necessarily high.
In their duty to protect our forces these two generals did not meet that standard. They were outwitted by a bunch of peasant guerrillas. If you want to read the official US Army report into the attack, you can find it here. Posted by Nick Fielding at 0 comments. The banality of modern warfare. For the majority of people outside Afghanistan, the war has largely been forgotten. Operations are winding down, they say, there is talk of peace and, anyway, Syria is a much more pressing issue.
In was in that context that I was struck by this news report I read yesterday. In itself, it appears to be nothing unusual - ANSF and Coalition forces killed a number of Taliban fighters overnight in what are termed "clean-up" operations. But look further down the report: "More than militants have been killed and arrested since the beginning of this month". As a result 22 armed Taliban were killed, 12 wounded and eight others were arrested by the ANSF," the ministry said in a statement providing daily operational updates.
They also found and seized weapons and defused roadside bomb, it noted. More than militants had been killed and arrested since beginning this month, according the figure released by the ministry. In eastern Wardak province, seven Taliban, including a local leader Mawlawi Enhan, were killed in a joint overnight operation in Nirkh district, a provincial government spokesman told Xinhua.
The Taliban insurgent group has not made comments yet. Every day, week-in, week-out, for months, if not for years, the Afghan defence ministry and the ISAF command have been reporting this level of casualties amongst the Taliban.
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Assuming that the figures are accurate, it is worth making a few points: first, generally these deaths are not occurring during firefights. They are usually as a result of night raids - where special forces arrive by helicopter in planned operations that are intelligence-led. The aim is to kill known individuals, preferably commanders and facilitators. Second, seldom do these reports, which are issued on a daily basis, mention the collateral damage - the civilians who get in the way or the faulty intelligence that results in the wrong people being killed or captured. We just have the bland figures.
Another month, another or so people killed in Afghanistan. Just in case you had forgotten the banality of modern, murderous warfare. Monday, 30 September Dutch publish lists of those killed during the late s.
Here is the link to the Dutch public prosecutor's lists of almost 5, Afghans murdered during the period when the country was ruled by the Communist Party in the late s. The Death Lists consist of rows of names, mostly in alphabetic order. Examples of such accusations are: echwani, ashrar and Maoist anti-revolutionary. On each list, a date between and is written. On some lists, there is a Government-stamp. The Transfer Orders give names as well, together with the names of parents, occupation and place of origin.
These documents also contain information about the locations where those involved were interrogated and detained. The documents were obtained in the course of a criminal investigation into the alleged involvement of an Afghan male residing in the Netherlands in war crimes and enforced disappearances, committed in Afghanistan in In this capacity, say the Dutch, he was involved in torture, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The suspect died in March , shortly before he was due to be arrested. The dates on the Transfer Orders give information about the dates of interrogation and detention.
Furthermore, the Transfer Orders bear the name and the signature of the involved officials. One of those officials was the deceased suspect. The authenticity of the documents is not in question. According to the Netherlands Forensic Institute, the emblem found on the documents as well as the printing technique and ink used to sign them, match the years Several survivors whose names are mentioned in the Transfer Orders, have confirmed to the Netherlands Police that the information contained in those documents is correct.
Around the dates mentioned and together with the other persons listed, they have indeed been handed over to AGSA and were subsequently transferred to the mentioned prisons, such as the Pul-i-Charkhi and the Deh Mazang. The accuracy of the contents of the Death Lists is confirmed by the accounts of surviving relatives. One witness has confirmed that her family members whose names appear on the Death Lists were indeed arrested and subsequently disappeared in the relevant time-frame. Finally, the information in the Death Lists is consistent with information contained in the Transfer Orders.
In several cases, there are matches between identifying information in both sets of documents. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction continues to publish the results of investigations into contracting fraud. The latest, Improvised Explosive Devices: Unclear whether culvert denial systems to protect troop are functioning or were ever installed , doesn't wait for the punchline to let you know the result. The report points out that IEDs are increasingly popular with the insurgents, with IED events increasing from 9, in to 16, in - an increase of 42 per cent.
To combat IEDs, roads are now built with culvert denial systems - in fact, reinforced metal bars embedded in concrete - to prevent explosives being laid in the drainage channels. Both have been arrested and charged with fraud and negligent homicide. Friday, 19 July More from the Abbottabad Commission report. I am rapidly coming to the conclusion that the Abbottabad Commission report is one of the most important documents to have come out of Pakistan for many years. It is full of insights into how Pakistan really operates - public officials that appear to know little about their specialist area, numerous examples of gross incompetence, buck-passing and massive corruption.
Here are a few more snippets. However, I urge readers to read a copy of the report, even if, by all accounts, the final version was watered down to placate the Army and intelligence services. Lt Col. Although he appears to be a very suspicious person and may well have played an active role in facilitating the Abbottabad incident, the ISI informed the Commission that neither Major Aziz nor Lt Col. Saeed, despite their suspicious background play any such role. This conclusion is somewhat strange as Saeed Iqbal left Pakistan immediately after the incident and attempted to sell his properties.
There were no visitors to the OBL Compound. There were no television cable or telephone lines. No rubbish was collected. There were 18 feet high walls at places and barbed wire. Feral Jundi. Afghanistan is now the least peaceful country in the world 3 weeks ago. Afghan LORD. Pakistani Girls Sold into Marriage 1 month ago. Madina, The invisible women of my world 1 month ago. Juan de Herat. Mahatma Gandhi : Non violence in peace and war 11 months ago. Afghanistan Analysis. Ghosts of Alexander. Kabul Perspective. Failure of Security Transition?
I should have raised hell 6 years ago. While there is Chai Sabz, there is hope. Abu Muqawama. About Me Nick Fielding United Kingdom This blog aims to highlight issues and information that don't always make it into the mainstream media. Recognising that comment is cheap, wherever possible it will link you directly to documents and sources that are mentioned in the text.
I realised some time ago that it was impossible to write about Afghanistan without writing about Pakistan and other neighbouring countries. With that in mind, the reader will come across articles that, while not specifically about Afghanistan, in some way shed light on the conflict. View my complete profile. Snap Shots. Posted by Nick Fielding at 1 comments. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction continues to publish the results of investigations into contracting fraud. The latest, Improvised Explosive Devices: Unclear whether culvert denial systems to protect troop are functioning or were ever installed , doesn't wait for the punchline to let you know the result.
The report points out that IEDs are increasingly popular with the insurgents, with IED events increasing from 9, in to 16, in - an increase of 42 per cent. To combat IEDs, roads are now built with culvert denial systems - in fact, reinforced metal bars embedded in concrete - to prevent explosives being laid in the drainage channels. Both have been arrested and charged with fraud and negligent homicide. Posted by Nick Fielding at 0 comments. Friday, 19 July More from the Abbottabad Commission report. I am rapidly coming to the conclusion that the Abbottabad Commission report is one of the most important documents to have come out of Pakistan for many years.
It is full of insights into how Pakistan really operates - public officials that appear to know little about their specialist area, numerous examples of gross incompetence, buck-passing and massive corruption. Here are a few more snippets. However, I urge readers to read a copy of the report, even if, by all accounts, the final version was watered down to placate the Army and intelligence services. Lt Col. Although he appears to be a very suspicious person and may well have played an active role in facilitating the Abbottabad incident, the ISI informed the Commission that neither Major Aziz nor Lt Col.
Saeed, despite their suspicious background play any such role. This conclusion is somewhat strange as Saeed Iqbal left Pakistan immediately after the incident and attempted to sell his properties. There were no visitors to the OBL Compound. There were no television cable or telephone lines. No rubbish was collected.
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There were 18 feet high walls at places and barbed wire. There was a 7-foot screening on the top wall. This was a security feature, not a purdah requirement. The children did not go to school. The size of the Compound expanded over time. There were no security guards. None of this negligence necessarily implied connivance. But it does suggest gross negligence at the very least. Their actual role in counter-terrorism was at best marginal, and in the tracking of OBL it was precisely zero. While there can be no excuse for this 'acceptance of realities' by senior officials, it has to be noted that they functioned in a very perverse political and administrative environment in which insistence on the correct performance of duty was often rewarded with severe punishment.
He suggested to Afridi they meet in Islamabad to discuss the matter in greater detail