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An example of this is being able to reverse the order of relationships between mental categories. For example, a child might be able to recognize that his or her dog is a Labrador, that a Labrador is a dog, and that a dog is an animal, and draw conclusions from the information available, as well as apply all these processes to hypothetical situations. During this stage the young person begins to entertain possibilities for the future and is fascinated with what they can be. Adolescents also are changing cognitively by the way that they think about social matters.
However, it carries over to the formal operational stage when they are then faced with abstract thought and fully logical thinking. Piagetian tests are well known and practiced to test for concrete operations.
The most prevalent tests are those for conservation. There are some important aspects that the experimenter must take into account when performing experiments with these children. One example of an experiment for testing conservation is an experimenter will have two glasses that are the same size, fill them to the same level with liquid, which the child will acknowledge is the same. Then, the experimenter will pour the liquid from one of the small glasses into a tall, thin glass. The experimenter will then ask the child if the taller glass has more liquid, less liquid, or the same amount of liquid.
The child will then give his answer. The experimenter will ask the child why he gave his answer, or why he thinks that is. During this time, people develop the ability to think about abstract concepts. It is often required in science and mathematics. This capability results from their capacity to think hypothetically. Piaget and his colleagues conducted several experiments to assess formal operational thought. In one of the experiments, Piaget evaluated the cognitive capabilities of children of different ages through the use of a scale and varying weights. The task was to balance the scale by hooking weights on the ends of the scale.
To successfully complete the task, the children must use formal operational thought to realize that the distance of the weights from the center and the heaviness of the weights both affected the balance. A heavier weight has to be placed closer to the center of the scale, and a lighter weight has to be placed farther from the center, so that the two weights balance each other. By age 10, children could think about location but failed to use logic and instead used trial-and-error.
Finally, by age 13 and 14, in early adolescence, some children more clearly understood the relationship between weight and distance and could successfully implement their hypothesis. Piaget gives the example of a child believing that the moon and stars follow him on a night walk. This conjunction of natural and non-natural causal explanations supposedly stems from experience itself, though Piaget does not make much of an attempt to describe the nature of the differences in conception.
The stage of cognitive growth of a person differ from another.
Logic in religious and non-religious belief systems
It affects and influences how someone thinks about everything including flowers. A 7-month old infant, in the sensorimotor age, flowers are recognized by smelling, pulling and biting. A slightly older child has not realized that a flower is not fragrant, but similar to many children at her age, her egocentric, two handed curiosity will teach her. In the formal operational stage of an adult, flowers are part of larger, logical scheme.
They are used either to earn money or to create beauty. Cognitive development or thinking is an active process from the beginning to the end of life. To achieve this balance, the easiest way is to understand the new experiences through the lens of the preexisting ideas. However, the application of standardized Piagetian theory and procedures in different societies established widely varying results that lead some to speculate not only that some cultures produce more cognitive development than others but that without specific kinds of cultural experience, but also formal schooling, development might cease at certain level, such as concrete operational level.
A procedure was done following methods developed in Geneva. Participants were presented with two beakers of equal circumference and height, filled with equal amounts of water. The water from one beaker was transferred into another with taller and smaller circumference.
On the other hand, an experiment on the effects of modifying testing procedures to match local cultural produced a different pattern of results. Piaget designed a number of tasks to verify hypotheses arising from his theory. Notwithstanding the different research traditions in which psychometric tests and Piagetian tasks were developed, the correlations between the two types of measures have been found to be consistently positive and generally moderate in magnitude. A common general factor underlies them. Piagetian accounts of development have been challenged on several grounds.
First, as Piaget himself noted, development does not always progress in the smooth manner his theory seems to predict. For example, even young infants appear to be sensitive to some predictable regularities in the movement and interactions of objects for example, an object cannot pass through another object , or in human behavior for example, a hand repeatedly reaching for an object has that object, not just a particular path of motion , as it becomes the building block of which more elaborate knowledge is constructed.
Social interaction teaches the child about the world and helps them develop through the cognitive stages, which Piaget neglected to consider. One important finding is that domain-specific knowledge is constructed as children develop and integrate knowledge. This enables the domain to improve the accuracy of the knowledge as well as organization of memories.
Skip to main content. Part II: Educational Psychology. Search for:. Return to Table of Contents. Cognitive development. In Encyclopedia of special education: A reference for the education of children, adolescents, and adults with disabilities and other exceptional individuals. Simply Psychology. Jean Piaget. In Key thinkers in linguistics and the philosophy of language. Neil J. Gale Virtual Reference Library. The role of action in the development of thinking. In Knowledge and development pp. Springer US. Mills, G. Wiebe Eds. Memory and intelligence. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Geber Ed. Piaget, Jean Byrne Ed. Strickland Ed. Detroit: Gale.
Critique of Pure Reason - Wikipedia
Salkind Ed. Piaget, Jean — Guthrie Ed. Child Development. Educational Psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Gruber, H. Quite independently, a similar formulation was almost simultaneously arrived at in medieval Europe by Theoderic of Freiberg died circa CE. The subsequent history of astronomy in classical and medieval Muslim civilisation consists of both theory and observations.
It was founded and established in Baghdad in the ninth century by the Caliph al-Mamun. The result was compiled into the Tested Astronomical Tables. Astronomical measurements required innovation in measuring instruments. The astrolabe is an example of an astronomical instrument that was derived from the Greeks but was improved by Islamic astronomers. According to the then prevalent Aristotelian natural philosophy, celestial bodies could only move in geocentric circles around the stationary earth.
While Ptolemy had acknowledged this principle in his Almagest , he had to abandon it in his planetary models in order to account for observed positions of planets. Ibn al-Haytham objected to this practice in his Doubts against Ptolemy. The medicine of classical and medieval Islamic civilisation was primarily derived from Greek medicine, in particular, the writings of Hippocrates and Galen.
Not surprisingly, most physicians of this period were Syriac Christians. In an amusing anecdote, a contemporary Muslim physician laments that he would be more successful if only his name were George! The first real hospital bimaristan , however, was built in Baghdad by Harun al-Rashid and was modeled after Jundishapur. This was soon followed by several other hospitals all over the Islamic world from Spain to India.
Hospitals were built by caliphs, court officials, and wealthy individuals. It had twenty-four physicians, and its specialists included ophthalmologists, surgeons, and orthopaedists. He tells us that it was as large as a castle and had its own water supply from the Tigris River. Another great hospital was the Nasiri hospital of Cairo completed in CE. It had an annual endowment of one million dirhams. Islamic physicians, while respectful toward their Hellenist predecessors, were not content simply with the preservation of past medical knowledge.
However, in keeping with the critical attitude of Islamic civilization toward knowledge, the Canon had its own critics. The latter not only rejected the Canon for his library, but used its paper for writing prescriptions! Nothing could be further from the truth. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE witnessed yet another transfer of knowledge, this time from Arabic into Latin.
Most of this translation activity was performed in Spain, especially in Toledo where Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived side by side, and also in Sicily. Some translators were Jews who translated Arabic works into Hebrew, or collaborated with others to translate Hebrew works into Latin. Suffice it to say, their works and theories were known and studied and led to further advances. In the disciplines of philosophy and theology, the views of Avicenna, Averroes, and Algazel and their readings of Aristotle are discernable in the works of Latin Scholastics like Albertus Magnus died CE and his student, Thomas Aquinas died CE.
Whereas Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, and others accepted a limited role for reason within the overall context of faith, the writings of Averroes were seen to champion unaided reason. Some Latin writers like Siger of Brabant died in the s CE became proponents of these views and founded the movement characterised as Latin Averroism. Theological writers like Albertus Magnus and Aquinas wrote polemical works against the Latin Averroists, but the movement seems to have continued growing.
But the influence went beyond these historical periods. Berggren, J. Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam. New York: Springer Verlag, Chittick, William. Dols, Michael W. Medieval Islamic Medicine. Berkeley: University of California Press, Fakhry, Majid. A History of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press, Frank, Richard. Al-Ghazali and the Asharite School. Durham, N. Richard McCarthy. Boston: Twayne, Gibb H. The Encyclopedia of Islam. New ed.
Leiden: Brill, Gillespie C. Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Hyman, Arthur and James Walsh. New York: Harper and Row, Ibn al-Haytham. London: The Warburgh Institute, Ibn Rushd Averroes. On the Harmony of Religions and Philosophy. George Hourani. London: Luzac, Tr: Simon van den Bergh. Ibn Sina Avicenna. The Life of Ibn Sina. William Gohlman. New York: Suny Press, Fazlur Rahman.
London: Oxford University Press, Ibn Tufayl. Lenn E. Goodman, New York: Twayne, Kennedy, E. Studies in the Islamic Exact Sciences. Beirut: American University of Berut Press, Astronomy in the Service of Islam. Leaman, Oliver. An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Lerner, Ralph and Muhsin Mahdi , eds. Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Lindberg, David ed. Science in the Middle Ages. Might such faith, then, have to rest on a prior faith—faith that God exists and that this is his messenger or vehicle of communication?
Faith might then have a purely rational foundation. But this could hardly be so for every person of faith, since not everyone who believes will have access to the relevant evidence or be able to assess it properly. Attempting to settle that concern by meeting the evidential requirement leads to circularity: believers are to accept theological truths on divine authority, yet the truth that there is such an authority historically mediated as the relevant tradition maintains is amongst those very truths that are to be accepted on divine authority—indeed, it is the crucial one.
The question remains how accepting this gift could be epistemically rational. The justifiability of belief that God exists is a typically focal issue in the Philosophy of Religion. Yet the theist traditions always make a foundational claim about an authoritative source, or sources, of revealed truth. What is salient is not just believing that God exists; it is believing that God exists and is revealed thus and so in great historical acts, in prophets, in scriptures, in wisdom handed down, etc.
The reasonableness of theism is therefore as much a matter of the reasonableness of an epistemology of revelation as it is of a metaphysics of perfect being. That argument holds that a loving God would make his existence clear to the non-resistant—but this claim is open to question. Similarly, accounts of theistic faith will be open to critique when they make assumptions about the mechanisms of revelation. Alternative understandings of revelation are available, however. In particular, it may be held that it is primarily the divine presence itself that is revealed—the reality, not merely a representation of it.
Propositional articulations of what is revealed may still be essential, but they need to be accepted as at a remove from the object of revelation itself, and therefore as limited. Not all models of faith however, identify it as primarily a matter of knowing or believing a proposition or a set of them.
What is most central to theistic faith may seem better expressed as believing in God, rather than as believing that God exists. Schellenberg , What is it to believe in, or have faith in, God beyond, or even independently of, believing that God exists?
To have faith in God is to make a practical commitment —the kind involved in trusting God , or, trusting in God. This, then, is a fiducial model —a model of faith as trust, understood not simply as an affective state of confidence, but as an action. The fiducial model is widely identified as characteristically Protestant. If, moreover, faith of the religious kind is itself a type of trust, then we may expect our understanding of religious faith to profit from an analysis of trust in general.
It is therefore worth considering what follows about the nature of faith of the sort exemplified in theistic faith from holding it to be a kind of trust. Conceptually fundamental to trust is the notion of a person or persons —the truster—trusting in some agent or agency—the trustee— for some assumedly favourable outcome though what the trustee is trusted for is often only implicit in the context. Trust involves a venture ; so too—it is widely agreed—does faith.
1. What are science and religion, and how do they interrelate?
So, if faith is trust, the venture of faith might be presumed to be the type of venture implicated in trust. Trust implies venture. Venturing in trust is usually assumed to be essentially risky, making oneself vulnerable to adverse outcomes or betrayal. Accordingly, it seems sensible to hold that one should trust only with good reason. It may thus on occasion be practically rational to trust a person whose likelihood of trustworthiness is low, if a sufficiently valuable outcome may be achieved only by so doing.
An unlikely rescuer may rationally be trusted if the only one available. But this approach misses something important in social intercourse, where we generally count it a virtue to be ready to trust others without such prior calculation. Such openness may still be broadly rational, however, given our long shared experience that willingness to trust others usually does elicit trustworthy behaviour: accordingly, though I may have little or no direct evidence that this particular fellow citizen of mine will prove trustworthy if I turn to her in a sudden predicament, I may have good evidence for the general reliability of others in my community.
Nevertheless, it can sometimes be reasonable to act decisively on the assumption that people will be worthy of trust in quite particular respects without having evidence for their trustworthiness sufficient to justify such decisiveness see, for example, Adams On a model that takes religious faith to consist fundamentally in an act of trust, the analogy with the venture of interpersonal trust is suggestive.
Yet there are also significant differences between the trusting involved in theistic faith and that involved in interpersonal trust. For one thing, venturing in trust would seem not to carry real risk if God really is the trustee. Given the existence of the God of unchanging love, one trusts in ultimately perfect safety. But the venture of actually entrusting oneself to God seems to begin with the challenge of being able to accept that, indeed, there is such a God. While some affirm that many people have sufficient evidence to justify this claim, others, as already noted, hold that everyone has to confront the evidential ambiguity of foundational theistic claims.
Trusting in God seems to presuppose, in other words, taking it on trust that God exists. But, if so, the question whether, and under what conditions, one may be entitled to such an evidence-transcending venture becomes pressing. One way to relieve this pressure is to offer a non-realist analysis of theological claims. On such a non-realist account, the model of faith as trust brackets the cognitive component of faith, and risks becoming, in effect, a model of faith as purely a certain kind of affective state.
But, in any case, non-realist models will be rejected by those who take faith to have a cognitive component that functions as a grasping—or would-be grasping—of how things really are. Reflecting on that proposal discloses further points of disanalogy, however. In cases of interpersonal trust a venture is often needed in initially taking the trustee to be trustworthy, but evidence will inevitably later emerge which will either confirm or disconfirm the truth of that claim—and trust may, and rationally should, be withdrawn if the news is bad.
Furthermore, interpersonal trust does not require actually believing that the trustee is worthy of trust, only that one decisively takes this to be true i. People of theistic faith, however, typically do believe that God exists and may be trusted for salvation, and, if—as we are here assuming—acting on this belief ventures beyond evidential support, then it is a venture that persists and is not confined to initial commitment only.
These reinforcing experiences, which often involve faith renewed in the face of apparent failures of divine love, do not, however, possess the uncontroversial status of evidence that independently and inter-subjectively confirms the initial venture. James observes, however, that many beliefs have causes that do not constitute or imply an evidential grounding of their truth.
In the next section, the possibility is considered that the gift of these motivational resources might not amount to actual belief. The motivational resources for faith-commitment may thus be an essentially social possession. As noted in Section 5, Aquinas holds that the available evidence, though it supports the truth of foundational faith-propositions, does not provide what Aquinas counts as sufficient i.
On some such assumptions, for example those made by Bayesians, the support provided by the evidence Aquinas adduces—or, by a suitable contemporary upgrading of that evidence, such as that provided in the works of Richard Swinburne—may be considered enough to make reasonable a sufficiently high degree of belief or credence in the truth of theistic faith-propositions so that believers need not venture beyond the support of their evidence.
The doxastic venture model may thus be regarded as capturing the spiritual challenge of faith more satisfactorily than do models that understand faith as conforming to evidentialism. This is because, on the doxastic venture model, faith involves a deeper surrender of self-reliant control, not only in trusting God, but in accepting at the level of practical commitment that there is a God—indeed, this God—who is to be trusted. Doxastic venture in relation to faith-propositions can be justifiable, of course, only if there are legitimate exceptions to the evidentialist requirement to take a proposition to be true just to the extent of its evidential support—and only if the legitimate exceptions include the kind of case involved in religious, theistic, faith-commitment.
A possible view of theistic faith-commitment is that it is wholly independent of the epistemic concern that cares about evidential support. On this view, faith reveals its authenticity most clearly when it takes faith-propositions to be true contrary to the weight of the evidence. Serious philosophical defence of a doxastic venture model of faith thus implies a supra-rational fideism, for which epistemic concern is not overridden and for which, therefore, it is a constraint on faith-commitment that it not accept what is known, or justifiably believed on the evidence, to be false.
Rather, faith commits itself only beyond , and not against, the evidence—and it does so out of epistemic concern to grasp truth on matters of vital existential importance. If such faith is to be justified, its cognitive content will on realist assumptions have to cohere with our best evidence-based theories about the real world.
Faith may extend our scientific grasp of the real, but may not counter it. Whether the desire to grasp more truth about the real than science can supply is a noble aspiration or a dangerous delusion is at the heart of the debate about entitlement to faith on this supra-rational fideist doxastic venture model.
Still, it is worth remarking that those who think that faith understood as doxastic venture may be justified face the challenge of providing the tools for weeding out intuitively distorted and unjustifiable forms of faith. On the other side, those evidentialists who reject doxastic venture as impermissible have to consider whether taking a stance on the nature of reality beyond anything science can even in principle confirm may not, in the end, be unavoidable, and potentially implicated in the commitments required for science itself see Bishop a, Chapters 8 and 9.
Some accounts allow that faith centrally involves practical commitment venturing beyond evidential support, yet do not require or, even, permit that the venturer actually believes the faith-proposition assumed to be true. Tennant holds a view of this kind: he takes faith to be the adoption of a line of conduct not warranted by present facts, that involves experimenting with the possible or ideal, venturing into the unknown and taking the risk of disappointment and defeat.
Andrei Buckareff and J. Schellenberg , propose non-doxastic venture models of propositional faith, with Schellenberg emphasising the positive evaluation that persons of faith make of the truth-claim to which they commit themselves. Bishop , in response to Buckareff, also agrees that authentic faith need not always be a specifically doxastic venture.
Rational assessment of religious faith, Audi thinks, must avoid treating it as implying belief, while recognising that greater confidence attaches to it than to religious hope. Some philosophers have suggested that the epistemological challenges faced by accounts of faith as involving belief beyond the evidence may be avoided by construing theist commitment as hope.
Muyskens contrasts hope with faith understood as belief , arguing that a religion of hope is both epistemically and religiously superior to a religion of faith. But faith is not generally understood as competing with hope Creel , and some philosophers identify faith with hoping that the claims of faith are true Pojman ; A more adequate model of faith as hope, then, may rather take faith to be acting in, or from, hope. All these three models, then —doxastic venture, sub-doxastic venture and venture in hope— fit the view that faith is consistent with doubt, and, indeed, impossible without doubt of some kind, though they allow that persons of faith may give firm and sustained commitment to the truth of faith-propositions in practice.
To be virtuous, faith must be faith in a worthy object: it is faith in God that is the theological virtue. More generally, faith is virtuous only when it is faith to which one is entitled. An account of the conditions under which faith is permissible is thus the key to an ethics of faith. On models of faith as a special kind of knowledge, or as firmly held belief, it may seem puzzling how faith could be a virtue—unless some implicit practical component emerges when such models are further explicated, or, alternatively, a case may be made for the claim that what is involuntary may nevertheless be praiseworthy, with theistic faith as a case in point Adams Fiducial models of faith seem more attuned to exhibiting faith as a virtue, though a defence of the trustworthiness of the one who is trusted for salvation may be required.
The Jamesian account already mentioned Section 7 aims to meet this need. If faith of the religious kind is to count as virtuous, it seems there must be a suitable degree of persistence and steadfastness in the commitment made. Persons of religious faith are faithful to the object of their commitment, though the salient kind of faithfulness may be a matter of the continual renewal of faith rather than of maintaining it unchanged.
See Audi for a discussion of faith and faithfulness in relation to virtue. Faith is only one of the Christian theological virtues, of course, the others being hope and charity or love, agape : and St Paul famously affirms that the greatest of these is love I Cor.
Religion and Politics
The question thus arises how these three virtues are related. One suggestion is that faith is taking it to be true that there are grounds for the hope that love is supreme—not simply in the sense that love constitutes the ideal of the supreme good, but in the sense that living in accordance with this ideal constitutes an ultimate salvation, fulfilment or consummation that is, in reality, victorious over all that may undermine it in a word, over evil.
The supremacy of love is linked to the supremacy of the divine itself, since love is the essential nature of the divine. What is hoped for, and what faith assures us is properly hoped for, is a sharing in the divine itself, loving as God loves see Brian Davies on Aquinas, On this understanding, reducing faith to a kind of hope Section 9 above would eradicate an important relation between the two—namely that people of faith take reality to be such that their hope for salvation, the triumph of the good is well founded, and not merely an attractive fantasy or inspiring ideal.