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However, Hillgruber was prepared to accept, albeit grudgingly, what he often called Germany's "Yalta frontiers" after the Yalta Conference of He often complained that the West German government was not doing enough to re-unite Germany. In a speech, he called on Bonn to create a new German nationalism based on respect for human rights that would ensure that future generations would not lose sight of the dream of re-unification.


Hillgruber was an Intentionalist on the origins of the Holocaust debate, arguing that Adolf Hitler was the driving force behind the Holocaust. This set Hillgruber against Functionalist historians such as Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat , whose "revisionist" claims on the origins of the Holocaust Hillgruber found distasteful.

He believed that the Holocaust was meant to be launched only with the invasion of the Soviet Union. In the essay "War in the East and the Extermination of the Jews", Hillgruber argued that based on a reading of Hitler's early speeches and writings that Hitler associated Jews and the Communists as one and the same, and accordingly Hitler regarded the destruction of the Jews and the Soviet Union as part and parcel of the same process.

Hillgruber took a rather extreme "No Hitler, no Holocaust" position. He believed it was Hitler alone who made the Holocaust possible. Hillgruber was one of the protagonists in the so-called Historikerstreit , the Historians' Dispute or Historians' Controversy of Hillgruber felt that the Holocaust was a horrific tragedy, but just one of many that occurred in the 20th century. For Hillgruber, the end of the "German East", in which he had been born and grew up, was just as tragic as the Holocaust.

Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for supporting at various war-time conferences the expansion of Poland and the Soviet Union at the expense of Germany. They also corresponded to objectives which had long been harboured by the main enemy powers, and which were put into effect during the war". In an apparent disavowal of his own criticism of the Anglophobic American historical writer David Hoggan in his book Germany and the Two World Wars , Hillgruber claimed in his essay that it had been British policy to seek the destruction of Germany since starting with Sir Eyre Crowe 's memo on Germany entitled "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany".

Perhaps most controversially, Hillgruber described how the German Wehrmacht acted in what he regarded as a "heroic" and "self-sacrificing" way in defending the German population against the Red Army and the "orgy of revenge" that they perpetrated in Hillgruber praised those German generals who had stayed loyal to Hitler during the 20 July plot as making the right moral decision.

Hillgruber argued that if Hitler had been killed, the Eastern Front would have collapsed faster than it did, thereby endangering the lives of millions of German civilians, and he therefore condemned the July plot as irresponsible. Of the two essays in Zweierlei Untergang , one was a summary of the history of the Holocaust. The other essay concerned the ending of the "Germanic East". Hillgruber argued that Germany's defeat was also Europe's defeat as while since the outcome of the war was to leave Western Europe in the American sphere of influence and Eastern Europe in the Soviet sphere of influence, leaving Europeans and Germans in particular without the prospect of having a "history in the future" i.

It was Habermas's attack in Die Zeit in July that first drew attention to Zweierlei Untergang , which had until then been an obscure book published in the spring of by the Siedler press of Berlin. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Andreas Hillgruber. Angerburg , East Prussia , Germany. Humboldt University, Berlin. Retrieved 5 May Martin's Press, page The New York Times.

Koch, London: Macmillan, pages Koch, London: Macmillan, , pages Baldwin, Peter "The Historikerstreit in Context" pages 3— A Preliminary Assessment" pages When war came in , it fell—with the notable exception of German East Africa— almost without serious resistance to the Allies.

Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany

The book, largely researched and compiled by a host of postgraduate assistants, was firmly based upon fresh and extensive documentary materials culled especially from archives in Austria and in the German Democratic Republic. Fischer further suggested that the well-publicized differences during the war between civilian and military leaders were ones of form rather than of substance. Moreover, Fischer suggested that vast annexations were seen, especially in right-wing circles, as a means of maintaining their Industry, Empire and the First World War 57 domestic dominance.

The Hamburg historian, Ritter asserted, had failed to approach his documents either with empathy or with historical understanding. While Fischer admitted that Wilhelm II was inclined to avoid making decisions and that Bethmann Hollweg did not share the view of the Pan-Germans that war would enhance domestic stability, he nevertheless continued to insist that war in constituted a Flucht nach vorn, a bold leap forward designed to establish German hegemony in Europe by war—especially before Russia became too powerful. Fischer suggested that war was postponed in only because Bethmann Hollweg insisted that Germany must first prepare herself diplomatically, economically and psychologically, and because Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz argued that the Kiel Canal must first be completed—which it was in June Only when Russia refused to be bluffed, the argument went, did war become inevitable.

Thus, a major share of responsibility for the war rested with St Petersburg. And since Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans did not immediately touch the vital interests of the other great powers, the risk was a calculated one. Rather than seeking to isolate Britain through neutrality, Hillgruber suggested, Bethmann Hollweg and Riezler merely sought to keep London as a distant partner in international crises—a step which would have loosened the AngloRussian entente of The same impersonal, tragic, fateful forces discovered by the apologists of the s appear again.

One begins to wonder who was in charge in Berlin, Riezler or Bethmann Hollweg? What is the student to conclude from all this? And where does the future lie in terms of scholarly investigation? It would appear that only the Serbian documents remain to be unearthed, and conservative estimates indicate that it will be well into the next century before Yugoslavian scholars progress to with their publication of diplomatic documents. Of immediate concern here are his two major analyses of the German state from Bismarck to the Weimar Republic: Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, — and Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, —, which appeared in an English-language edition as The German Empire, — There is no room for subtlety or complexity.

Wehler paints his pictures in black and white. Foreign affairs are seen only as a Industry, Empire and the First World War 61 manipulative means of controlling domestic unrest; they are accorded barely ten pages in The German Empire, less than ten per cent of the book. Throughout this dialectical conflict theory, he interweaves the impotence of political parties, the extra-parliamentary role of special interest groups and the mobilization Sammlung of the traditional classes threatened by economic modernization.

The only escape for many was anti-Semitism, imperialism, integral nationalism and, finally, war. In other words, Wehler argues that the system possessed built-in tensions between the forces of change and industrialization, on the one hand, and those of the status quo among the pre-industrial agrarian elite, on the other.

This functionalist approach in the end owes much to the works not only of Marx, Engels and Kehr, but also to those of Max Weber and Thorstein Veblen. The First World War, according to Wehler, changed none of this. Prewar conflicts of interest remained irreconcilable. Social Darwinism, racism and anti-Semitism were the legacy that the Second Reich bequeathed to the Third. Obviously, nations other than Germany were beset by social Darwinism and anti-Semitism and enamored of social imperialism; what state in did not have its lunatic fringe?

And what state in did not view war as a legitimate means of conducting politics? The concept of continuity is far too rigid: Bismarck was no Hitler, and his policies were at least based squarely upon reality. The state was on the way to greater parliamentarization; the working classes and their representatives had conquered almost every major city hall.

Moreover, for all his emphasis on social and economic history, Wehler ignores the role of women despite the fact that by Germany had some , females organized in various clubs, and would add more than , women to its labor force during the First World War. Above all, one takes umbrage at the constant polarization of historical verdicts, at the lack of shades of grey between the poles of white and black. Like Fischer before him, he has changed the parameters of the historical debate.

Above all, he has challenged the basically conservative West German historical guild Zunft to confront the issue of the reaction of German society to Industry, Empire and the First World War 63 modernization and industrialization. He has stimulated debate, stirred investigation into the long-range origins of the Third Reich and has firmly added a social and economic component to traditional political and diplomatic history.

In the process, Wehler has taken delight in becoming the gadfly of the profession, a role previously perfected in England by A. He too eschews the study of human beings and chooses to focus on impersonal forces: the interaction between the interests of the capitalist class and those of the working class. Given this rigid and dominant class structure, it is not surprising to find that the state is accorded only a semi-independent role in the historical process. It is Strukturgeschichte in its most stringent form.

Kocka marshals massive statistical data to make the case that the war impoverished the working class, especially after , as a result both of a decline in real wages and of a shortage hence greater cost of foodstuffs. With regard to industry, the picture was more complex: while war industries enjoyed sharp rises in profits, consumer-oriented industries suffered declines. Kocka identifies a group of , entrepreneurs and managers as the winners in the war, the 6.

The position of the upper middle class deteriorated significantly as a result of protracted war: while the new Mittelstand of white-collar employees was proletarianized, the old bourgeoisie of high-ranking civil servants was likewise on the losing side with regard to both income and inherited property. In other words, while the numerically small industrial elite did very well during the war, both the middle class and the working class drew closer together in terms of loss of income and property. Hence, Kocka explains, it is hardly surprising that the workers remained loyal throughout most of the period —18 and rejected revolution in favor of gradualism.

For, if the Wilhelmian state were beset by the sort of severe class dichotomy depicted by Kocka, one can only wonder why this did not readily translate into political activity and class confrontation. The answer would seem to be that neither trade unions nor workers suffered as much as Kocka would have us believe. Reality, it would appear, refuses to correspond to his model. In this group published a three-volume history of Germany in the First World War35 that set the tone for much of the East German historiography on the war.

Again, monocausal explanations brazenly ignore the complexity of a German society engaged in modern industrial warfare for the first time.

Thus projected into a field for which they were utterly unprepared, military leaders for the first time were brought face to face with the social and economic factors which, long before the war, had destabilized the Wilhelmian state and which, even as the war raged on, would continue to transform it. Unable to refuse the demands made by the organized labor movement and unwilling to curb either the profits or the power of heavy industry, the military helped to legitimize collective bargaining and to lay the foundations of postwar inflation.

According to Feldman, neither soldiers nor statesmen were motivated by the national interest; rather, they became entangled in the web of intrigues spun by the bureaucratic-military elite that governed Germany. For nearly eighteen months the agreements held. Excessive war profits and waste as well as occasional labor unrest were overlooked as production did, in fact, increase.

By June , however, the pact unravelled. Feldman thus stresses the limits of Ludendorffs alleged dictatorial powers. His interpretation is moderate and sympathetic: while he concedes that the Second Reich was beset by the problems arising from a premodern and pre-industrial social structure and mentality, Born nevertheless suggests that on the whole it was liberal, constitutional and respectable, and certainly as advanced as many of the more progressive nations of the West.

Therewith, Born, like Schoenbaum before him, seeks to restore the debate to its pre-Wehler state. What does the future portend for the socioeconomic history of the Second Reich? Taking the British historian E. Thompson as well as the French Annales School as their models, scholars such as Clifford Geertz, Hans Medick and Carlo Ginzburg have sought to shift the focus to the everyday life of those men, women and children who come from the traditionally neglected ausgegrenzt strata of society. Their approach centers squarely upon the narrative history of how human beings have been affected by the great social and economic developments of late nineteenth-century Germany, and thus offers an alternative or correction?

Whether this latest development will end in mere romantic nostalgia, as Wehler has suggested, or whether it truly will shed light upon those who paid the price for modernization and industrialization remains to be seen. A growing number of scholars both in Germany and abroad have analyzed what now is commonly called the military-industrial complex in order to compare and to contrast the German way of war against especially the Anglo-Saxon way of war. To what degree was it willing and able to mobilize both manpower and material reserves toward victory? To date, this third and final field of historical inquiry Industry, Empire and the First World War 67 has remained relatively free of the personal and methodological bitterness associated with Fischer and Wehler.

A first attempt to analyze the role of labor and armaments production during the war was undertaken by Robert B. Even so, it was not until the appointment of Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff in late that the opposition of the trade unions and the General Staff was overcome and the Auxiliary Service Law instituted in December The law was not a success.

In the short run, too many loopholes and special exemptions undermined its effectiveness. Armeson saw its real value in its long-range implications: it accorded Parliament an unprecedented voice in administering the law, it effectively ended the Burgfrieden of , it laid the groundwork for the future Weimar political coalition, and it provided the Third Reich with a precedent for its drastic system of manpower controls two decades later. In West Germany, Lothar Burchardt took up themes first broached in the s by Hans Herzfeld in his pioneering work on German industry and the military.

With a few notable exceptions such as Generals August Keim and Colmar von der Goltz as well as Heinrich Class, both the public and the private sectors had been indifferent to economic planning for war.

Andreas Hillgruber - Wikipedia

Such disparate theorists as Friedrich Engels and Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder, had predicted that future wars were bound to be of long duration; and since the Reich imported nearly half of its foodstuffs and raw materials, it readily became apparent that it was in no position to fight a lengthy war. In addition, the Imperial Treasury was concerned that any economic preparations for war would seriously jeopardize an already severely strained budget.

Finally, Burchardt shows that there existed virtually no contacts in this matter either between the various agencies of government, or between the public and private sectors. The end result, unsurprisingly, was that almost nothing had been done to provide systematic planning for war. Overlap was the norm. On the other hand, the military was sufficiently united to resist successfully all attempts at reform. Deist also disagrees with the generally held notion that the Third Supreme Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff constituted a military dictatorship; Ludendorff, he argues, could never quite bring himself to assume political responsibility for the fate of the nation.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

While the War Office was willing to make concessions to labor, the General Staff tended to side with heavy industry and, under Colonel Bauer, sought to create a repressive rightwing dictatorship with proto-fascist trappings. Yet, the military became so heavily involved in national politics during the war that the revolution of —19 ought to be regarded as a revolt against militarism rather than as a political movement. The same can be said of a new collection of documents edited by Deist and Volker Berghahn that shed light upon German military and naval armaments policies up to The editors argue that the European armaments race prior to was the prototype of modern arms races among industrial nations, and thus suggest that it can shed light upon present American-Soviet armaments relations.

The edition is especially welcome since most German military records were destroyed by Allied air raids in and , and since the only published collection containing some of these materials is out of print. Like Deist, Geyer argues that the notion that the German military coopted heavy industry into its domain during the war is too simplistic as their interests were far from identical.

Change and adaptability were the hallmarks of German armaments policies. Trench warfare levelled classes. The coming years thus are likely to witness continued heated debate between the proponents of Strukturgeschichte and those of Alltagsgeschichte. Unfortunately, the West German Zunft remains intent on insisting that only one approach—whichever it may be—is viable. If there is a lesson to be learned from the academic donnybrooks of the s and s, surely it must be that the study of history is sufficiently abundant and elastic to allow for more than one methodological approach.

Domestic and foreign policies are not mutually exclusive; rather, they interact constantly to produce the national polity, in which one, and then the other, may dominate. Neither are narrative and critical history mutually exclusive. A judicious mix of narrative case studies and functional analysis is dictated, it would seem, by common sense alone.

The current trend toward Alltagsgeschichte can only serve to enrich our understanding of the past—without necessarily negating other approaches. The charm of historical investigation, as R. Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht. See John A. Ein politischer Historiker in seinen Briefen Boppard, , p. Paul W. Schwabe and Reichardt, Gerhard Ritter, p. Krieg der Illusionen. Eckart Kehr, Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Jahrhundert, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Berlin, Gordon A.

Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, pp. Wilhelm II. Sieber ed. Geburtstag am August Basel, , Vol. Also, Volker R. Imanuel Geiss ed. Selected Documents New York, An interim evaluation now exists by Bernd F. A recent biography of Riezler by Wayne C. Deutsche Kriegspolitik — East Berlin, The thesis of the book is embodied in its title. Heath is presently reissuing its time-honored anthology on The Outbreak of World War I in order to update the historiography of the Fischer controversy.

Collingwood, The Idea of History Oxford, , pp. Not only did the greatest cultural achievements of the Weimar era mirror the political struggles that after were to become such a familiar trademark of German life, but culture itself was enlisted in the struggle over the political future of the German people. No matter how much Weimar intellectuals may have prided themselves upon the superiority of Geist, or spirit, to the amoral world of power politics, the culture they created was part of a much larger struggle for cultural and intellectual hegemony.

It was a struggle waged not so much between different social classes as within the German bourgeoisie between those who believed in cooperation across class lines on the basis of parliamentary democracy and those who categorically rejected the social and political compromises upon which the Weimar Republic had been founded.

Any study of Weimar culture, therefore, must devote careful attention to the burning political issues that infiltrated virtually every corner of German life from to Conversely, any study of Weimar politics must also seek to understand the way in which Weimar culture not only replicated the struggle for social and political hegemony, but entered into that struggle with a sense of engagement that has few parallels in modern history.

This approach follows the lead of a new generation of French historians who have shifted the focus of their attention from the socioeconomic to the 74 Culture and Politics in the Weimar Republic 75 cultural determinants of historical change. Not only did their work on the intellectual origins of the Third Reich make it appear that there was no alternative to the Nazi seizure of power in January , but their commitment to exposing the cultural and intellectual roots of Nazism made it difficult for them to appreciate the diversity and heterogeneity of German culture. Regarding the formation of character and the development of the human reason as the highest goals of cultural activity, this ideal presupposed the sublimation of instinctual energy, including sexuality, into work or cultural achievement.

Culture, therefore, served as a vehicle for the refinement of passion and for the elevation of the instinctual to the level of the spiritual. This avowedly elitist, unabashedly male and inherently repressive moral ethos offered emancipation on narrowly defined terms that denied the instinctual bases of human activity. At the same time, the rise of the masses to social and political consciousness and the emergence of mass political parties on both the left and the right constituted a direct challenge to the elitist character of those institutions through which the German bourgeoisie had traditionally exercised its social and political hegemony.

As the self-proclaimed apostle of cultural rebirth, Nietzsche took special pains to expose the inherently repressive and moribund character of nineteenth-century, bourgeoisChristian Europe. In the final analysis, it was not the reactionary but the apocalyptic and revolutionary Nietzsche who had the greatest impact upon the cultural life of Wilhelmine Germany. The dramatic transformation of the German economy in the last decades of the Second Empire produced two discernible, yet antithetical cultural responses. Fascinated by the sudden and dramatic changes that seemed to be taking place at all levels of German life, this cadre of disaffected artists and intellectuals provided fertile soil in which the seeds of modernist culture could take root and flourish.

The deracination, or bankruptcy, of traditional bourgeois culture thus combined with the millenarian fervor of the modernist revolt to create a cultural environment in which war was no longer abhorred, but welcomed as the moment of apocalyptic resolution. As the war dragged on, the euphoria and unity of purpose that had captivated the nation in August gave way to a mood of increasing exhaustion and disgruntlement. With the collapse of the Second Empire, Germany had entered a new age, an age whose dominant spirit was that of cultural modernism. Indeed, the very choice of Weimar as the site of the constitutional convention had been dictated as much by cultural as by political considerations.

As a result of their efforts, the new constitutional order carried a distinctly liberal imprimatur even though the party to which they belonged was the weakest member of the governmental coalition. Bourgeois loyalties to the new republican order were severely strained not only by the compromises which the leaders of the DDP had to make to the Social Democrats in the area of fiscal and economic policy, but also by the deep-seated bitterness which the imposition of the Versailles peace treaty produced within virtually every sector of the German bourgeoisie.

By far the most damaging blow to these loyalties, however, came in the form of the runaway inflation of the early s. Modernization, however, had many different faces. In the economic sphere, modernization manifested itself primarily in the rationalization of German industry and in the increasing concentration of economic power in the hands of large capitalist enterprises that, to all outward appearances, were more powerful than the state itself.

To Germans and non-Germans alike, Weimar became synonymous with the spirit of modernity. Whereas before the war the modernist revolt had been essentially apolitical and had defined human emancipation more in aesthetic and psychological than in political terms, the postwar period witnessed the emergence of a radically new strand of cultural modernism that sought to forge an alliance between cultural and political revolution. Although the fact that this split existed had already become apparent before in Munich and other centers of urban culture,38 after the war the desire to make art more accessible to the masses merged with the revolutionary impulses on the German Left to produce a new concept of art that sought to exploit its potential as an instrument of popular enlightenment and agitation.

Driven by the need to explain the collapse of socialist unity in August and the failure of the revolutionary movement after the end of the First World War, Marxist theory in the immediate postwar period demonstrated remarkable vitality. Among the most important developments was the attempt by Georg Lukacs and Karl Korsch to return Marxism to its Hegelian origins and to infuse it with the basic values of bourgeois humanism. For the champions of the modernist revolt, this question could only have been answered in the negative.

In many essential respects, however, the stabilization of the mark was to prove every bit as damaging to the future of Weimar democracy as the inflation. The various measures taken to stabilize the mark inflicted additional and in some cases severe economic hardship upon those social strata that had already been forced to bear the brunt of the inflation. Moreover, the authoritarian manner in which the mark had been stabilized did much to aggravate the incipient legitimacy crisis that had plagued the Weimar Republic ever since its founding in More important still, the uneven economic recovery that Germany experienced between and bypassed economically and politically significant elements of the German middle class, with the result that they became increasingly disaffected from the existing system of government.

Despite its hostility towards the German bourgeoisie, however, the art of Grosz and his associates after was devoid of any genuine revolutionary conviction. The defeat of the German left between and had a profound effect upon Grosz, and he was never able to recover the passion of his early commitment to the cause of revolutionary socialism. The combination of resignation and biting satire that characterized the art of the Neue Sachlichkeit could also be seen in the development of German theater in the second half of the s.

In drama, as in the visual arts, the messianic idealism of early German expressionism gave Culture and Politics in the Weimar Republic 85 way to a new conception of theater that was politically committed, yet devoid of revolutionary conviction. The most innovative force in Weimar theater was Bertholt Brecht, who in the mids had been converted to a highly idiosyncratic and non-doctrinaire form of Marxism by Walther Benjamin and Karl Korsch.

Deeply distrustful of both the excessive emotionalism and the stylized subjectivism of the expressionist movement, Brecht began to formulate the outlines of a new dramatic idiom that would enable him to use the stage as a forum for the discussion and propagation of ideas. Early Weimar cinema was profoundly influenced by the expressionist rebellion in art and literature. Moreover, the thematic content of early Weimar cinema, with its fascination for characters of monstrous proportions who stood outside the pale of conventional morality, was fully consistent with the way in which the first generation of German expressionists had openly flaunted their disdain for the 86 Modern Germany Reconsidered basic values of traditional bourgeois culture.

No film better epitomized the eclipse of the expressionist impulse in Weimar cinema than G. With stark and unrelenting realism, Pabst used the fate of a typical Viennese family to depict the moral and economic decay of the Austrian and—by way of extension—German middle class under the impact of the postwar inflation. At no point in his film did Pabst offer a political solution to the moral and social crisis of the great inflation.

Life on the joyless street was a life without hope, a life of unremitting despair. To those who still identified themselves with the basic values of the bourgeois humanist tradition, on the other hand, it seemed as if their very culture was collapsing around them. Now there are times when a whole generation is caught in this way between two ages, two modes of life, with the consequence that it loses all power to understand itself and has no standard, no security, no simple acquiescence….

What he had to go through alone and misunderstood, thousands suffer today. Thus the epochal consciousness becomes detached from being, and is concerned only with itself. One who holds such a view cannot but be inspired with a consciousness of his own nullity. His awareness of the end as annihilation is simultaneously the awareness that his own existence is null.

The epochal consciousness has turned a somersault in the void. To theirs one might also add those of Oswald Spengler, Thomas Mann, Martin Heidigger, Carl Gustav Jung and Sigmund Freud, to mention only a few of those who tried to come to terms with the demise of their cultural heritage.

To be sure, it is unlikely that Hofmannstahl ever appreciated the political implications of what he was saying. Still, his lament over the estrangement of spirit from life struck a responsive chord among those who sought to enlist German culture in the struggle against the hated Weimar system. In a broader sense, the conservative revolution defined itself in essentially moral and spiritual terms and sought nothing less than the rebirth of the human spirit. To be sure, Nazism manifested that same disdain for the traditional bourgeois order that had found expression in the modernist revolt.

By the same token, Nazism portrayed itself as a millenarian movement with rhetoric and imagery that had been either consciously or unconsciously appropriated from the modernist movement. The struggle for cultural hegemony, therefore, was never a struggle between equals but one in which the anti-republican right enjoyed a decisive material advantage in the form of the publishing houses they controlled and the financial support they received from conservative economic elites. Abraham, however, has used the concept almost exclusively as a category of political analysis and never addressed the broader cultural dimensions of the term.

For varying statements of the Abraham thesis, see D. On the political dimensions of Weimar culture, see the work of two East German scholars B. Schraeder and J. Vanovich New Haven, Conn. See also L. Hunt ed. For a critique of the explanatory claims that Stern and others—most notably Ralf Dahrendorf in his classic study on Society and Democracy in Germany Garden City, NY, —have made on behalf of the concept of illiberalism, see K.

See G. For example, see K. Conze and J. Jahrhundert, Vols 1 and 4 Stuttgart, and Stark and B. See also the exemplary study of higher education in the Second Empire by K. Kocka ed. Mann, Buddenbrooks, tr. Lowe-Porter New York, , pp. My reading of Mann is indebted to the seminal essay by G. Mitchell London, , pp.


Large and W. Green New York, , pp. See the conflicting interpretations in A. In this connection, see J.

Bradbury and J. McFarlane eds , Modernism — Middlesex, , pp. Bronner and D. See also the classic study by B. On the expressionist movement in drama and poetry, see W. On expressionist painting, see P. Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, tr. Sabler New York, For further information, see M.

Portner, Die Verfassungspolitik der Liberalen— Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, —, tr. Steinberg Chicago, , pp. Gerth and C. Neumann, Die deutschen Parteien. Wesen und Wandel nach dem Kriege Berlin, , pp. Evans Oxford, , pp. Hermand and F. See also the collections of essays published by L Reinisch ed. Eine Bilanz der zwanziger Jahre Stuttgart, ; K. Bullivant ed. Phelan ed. Pachter, Weimar Etudes New York, For a useful survey of literature in the Weimar Republic, see R.

Taylor, Literature and Society in Germany, — Sussex, , pp. La Capra and S. On Brecht, see below in this chapter. Livingstone Cambridge, Mass. For a short, though extremely useful elucidation of this work, see G. Parkinson, Georg Lukacs London, , pp. On the place of this text in the development of Marxist humanism, see the seminal study by A Arato and P.


See also Sokel, Writer in Extremis, pp. Willett ed. But, on the other hand, he argued that Moscow's foreign policy was conducted in a way that was rational and realistic, while the foreign policy of Berlin during the Nazi era was completely irrational and unrealistic. So effectively did Weinberg and Rothfels demolish Hillgruber's arguments that he repudiated his previous views.

In the s and s Hillgruber often attacked historians such as David Irving and Viktor Suvorov for putting forward the same arguments as he had done in Hillgruber's area of expertise was German history from to , especially its political , diplomatic and military aspects. He argued for understanding this period as one of continuities. Hans Mommsen wrote that the "ground-laying works of Andreas Hillgruber Hillgruber argued that in the s, Germany had won a position of "semi-hegemony" in Europe, and that Otto von Bismarck had three options for preserving that "semi-hegemony": [18].

Hillgruber argued that the "war-in-sight crisis" of was Bismarck's way of probing the European reaction towards a German "preventive war" to destroy France, and finding that Russia was unsupportive and Britain inclined to intervene, chose the third option. Hillgruber argued that the accession of Wilhelm II in marked a watershed in German diplomatic history as Wilhelm was not content with "semi-hegemony" in Europe, and instead sought a power of Weltpolitik intended to give Germany "world power status". To some extent he agreed with Fritz Fischer 's assessment that the differences between Imperial , Weimar and Nazi foreign policy were of degree rather than kind.

Moreover, he accepted Fischer's argument that Germany was primarily responsible for World War I , but as a follower of the Primat der Aussenpolitik "primacy of foreign policy" school, Hillgruber rejected Fischer's Primat der Innenpolitik "primacy of domestic policy" argument as to why Germany started the First World War. Hillgruber argued in the aftermath of Fischer's book Griff nach der Weltmacht Grasping at World Power that Germany had not started a premeditated war of aggression in In Hillgruber's opinion, after the war had begun, a split occurred within the German leadership between the moderate imperialism of the Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg , who wished for territorial gains if they could be obtained, but was prepared to settle for a peace based on the pre status quo , and a more radical group centered on General Erich Ludendorff and the rest of the Third Supreme Command who wanted total victory over all of Germany's enemies and wide-ranging annexations in Europe, Asia and Africa.

In his book Grossmachtpolitik und Militarismus im Jahrundert , Hillgruber took a revisionist view of the Treaty of Versailles. In , the American historian Robert M. Citino wrote that "Hillgruber's thesis has become the consensus among German historians". Referring to M. Despite the example provided by Ludendorff and his circle, for Hillgruber, the changes in German foreign policy introduced by National Socialist Ostpolitik Eastern Policy were so radical as to be almost differences of kind rather than degree.

He argued that Nazi foreign policy was an extremely radical version of traditional German foreign policy. He set out a thesis that goals such as the Remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Anschluss with Austria, which had been the end-goals during the Weimar period, were just the beginning for the Nazis.

Unlike the Weimar government, the Nazis' desire to re-militarize was only a step on the road to the complete domination of all Europe, and eventual world domination. Hillgruber argued that these assumptions about the Soviet Union shared by the entire military elite allowed Hitler to push through a "war of annihilation" against the Soviet Union with the assistance of "several military leaders", even through it was quite clear to the military that such a war would violate all standards of civilized warfare and would be waged in the most inhumane fashion possible. From the s on, Hillgruber was regarded by other historians as one of the world's foremost authorities on German military-diplomatic history, his theory about Hitler having a Stufenplan stage-by-stage plan being especially influential.

Muller called Hillgruber "the most distinguished German diplomatic historian of his generation". Hillgruber argued that Adolf Hitler had a Stufenplan stage-by-stage plan for conquest and genocide in Eastern Europe, and then the world. Hillgruber argued that after the conquest of the Soviet Union , Hitler wanted to seize most of Africa, to build a huge navy , and in alliance with both the Japanese and the British to engage the United States in a "War of the Continents" for world domination.

Craig praised Hillgruber for his "masterful delineation of Hitler's grand strategical plan". Hillgruber maintained that the strategy of Blitzkrieg stemmed largely from economic factors, namely, that for the earlier stages of the Stufenplan , Germany did not have the economic resources for a long war, and that therefore a military programme based upon quality, not quantity, was the most rational use of German economic capacity.

Hillgruber regarded Hitler as a fanatical ideologue with a firmly fixed programme, and criticized the view of him as a grasping opportunist with no real beliefs other than the pursuit of power - a thesis promoted by such British historians as A. Taylor and Alan Bullock , and which Hillgruber thought profoundly shallow and facile. World War II , for Hillgruber, really consisted of two wars.

Hillgruber saw Hitler's foreign policy program was totally unrealistic and incapable of realization.